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5 A World Community of Neighbours in 
the Making
Resource Cosmopolitics and Mongolia’s ‘Third Neighbour’ 
Diplomacy
Uradyn E. Bulag*
Introduction: Mongolia’s Third Neighbour Policy
The late 1980s was a momentous period in world history, and like many 
countries in the world, Mongolia was caught up in it.1 The country’s 
pro-democracy movement, which rose in momentum in the same period, 
was simultaneously an anti-Soviet colonial liberation movement, as it 
denounced Soviet exploitation, colonization and even genocide in the late 
1930s. Meanwhile, the Sino-Soviet détente was accompanied by the Soviet 
withdrawal of troops from Mongolia (Radchenko 2012), a rapid waning of 
the Soviet power, and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991. 
Thereupon Mongolia lost its traditional guarantor of independence as much 
as it rejected it. What it meant for the new democracy was that it was left 
to face China alone, a historical nemesis, and a communist state that had 
just used its military power to crush its student movement in Beijing and 
the Tibetan rebellion in 1989. As Inner Mongols from China flooded into 
Mongolia, the sinicized demeanour and speech, perceived or real, of some 
of the visitors horrif ied the Mongols in Mongolia, serving as a mirror for the 
Mongols to see what a Chinese colonization might look like (Bulag 1998). 
They developed a profound sense of insecurity; Mongols were paranoid that 
an impoverished Russia might sell Mongolia to China, something called for 
by ultra-rightist nationalists such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union and Russia’s fall in fortune galvanized Mongolia to reshape 
its foreign policy as a matter of national survival.
In June 1990, a month after the Mongolian People’s Republic amended 
its Constitution to legalize opposition parties and scheduled a multi-party 
*  My thanks to the editors for invitation to ‘The Art of Neighbouring: Old Crossroads and 
New Connections along the PRC’s Borders’ they organized at Asia Research Institute, National 
University of Singapore.
1 Mongolia was known as the Mongolian People’s Republic from 1924 to 1992. 
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election, the United States sent its f irst residential ambassador, and on 
August 2, 1990, less than a month after the election, the US Secretary of 
State James A. Baker, III came to visit Mongolia and addressed the new 
Mongolian parliament to bolster this young democracy. He reportedly 
told the Mongolians to the effect that ‘Mongolia has two good neighbours, 
but if needed a third, the US would be happy to be it’ (Campi 2005: 48). 
The United States then led the way in supporting Mongolia’s transition, 
rallying democratic countries to provide economic assistance (Addleton 
2013).
The United States’ neighbourly posture to Mongolia was, no doubt, 
designed to replace the collapsing Soviet Union, and help Mongolia to bal-
ance China’s growing economic and political influence. As Munkh-Ochir 
Dorjjugder writes, ‘A rhetorical gesture to support the nation’s f irst move 
toward democracy […], it meant more to Mongolians than to any American 
present at the speech. The idea, possibly quickly forgotten in Washington, 
was immediately picked up by the Mongolian elite’ (Dorjjugder 2011). 
Although the Mongolians were deeply encouraged and inspired by James 
Baker’s proposal, and began to seek ‘third neighbours’ among democratic 
and economically advanced nations, according to Alicia Campi, the US 
did not initially appear to be willing to be committed to its own promise:
As former Mongolian Minister of Foreign Affairs, L. Erdenechuluun 
wrote: ‘To many Mongolian politicians and government off icials, the 
US would appear as the savior of new Mongolia and “major pillar” of its 
national security’. However, at f irst, American off icials dismissed the 
Third Neighbour concept as a non-starter, because they viewed Mongolia 
as a friendly, but minor nation wedged between signif icant American 
rivals, Russia and the PRC. (Campi 2010: 90).
The initial non-committal stance of the US was a reminder to Mongolia 
that the virtual non-territorial ‘third neighbours’ could never be a physical 
deterrent to any Chinese or Russian aggression. Thus, in the National 
Security Concept developed in 1994, Mongolia moved away from its clas-
sical approach of ‘hard balancing’ or relying on a friend against an enemy. 
It declared that Mongolia’s foreign policy would be based on political 
realism, nonalignment, pursuit of national interest, and participation 
in international efforts to strengthen international peace and security. 
Responding to the changed geopolitical condition of Mongolia, and re-
positioning itself as a ‘small state’, Mongolia began to treat China and 
Russia as equal neighbours, hoping to keep them at equal distance while 
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improving relations with them simultaneously. Formulated as neighbours, 
Mongolia no longer treats them as friend or enemy, so that Mongolia’s new 
post-socialist foreign policy is off icially not to antagonize either, still less 
both. Importantly, Mongolia revived the 1930s’ idea of building a neutral 
state, as advanced by the Buryat Mongolian scholar Tseveen Jamtsarano. 
This is best manifested in the declaration of Mongolia’s territory to be a 
‘nuclear-weapon-free zone’ made by President P. Ochirbat to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on September 25th, 1992. It was a solemn 
pledge that Mongolia would not take sides with either of its neighbours or 
allow its territory to be used against the other as happened in the 1960s 
to the end of the 1980s when Mongolia was a host to a number of Soviet 
military bases with nuclear weapons.2
After more than a decade of active experiment, Mongolia formally 
enshrined its Third Neighbour policy in the renewed National Security 
Concepts of Mongolia passed in June 2010. More than any other nations 
in the world, the concept of ‘neighbour’ has come to occupy the core in 
Mongolia’s conceptualization of its place in the world. In this new policy, 
Mongolia pivots its national sovereignty not only on treating China and 
Russia as neighbours, keeping them at equal distance, but more importantly 
on the so-called ‘third neighbours’, a conglomeration of democracies plus 
a few select friendly non-democracies. These ‘third neighbours’, of which 
the US, the EU, and Japan being the most important, are all territorially 
non-contiguous with Mongolia, either by land or by sea.
This chapter is an attempt to understand Mongolia’s Third Neighbour 
approach as its new art of neighbouring. Mongolia’s new foreign policy has 
been primarily for defensive purpose, to use the Third Neighbours to offset 
any aggression from either of its territorial neighbours, especially China. 
Yet, declaring itself a neutral state, pursuing a policy of nonalignment, 
how not to use or not to be used by the ‘third neighbours’ against China or 
Russia demands Mongolia to exercise its ‘smart power’, as it were. The key 
to this art of neighbouring lies in how to avoid the political in the profound 
political solution to maintenance of Mongolia’s sovereignty.
2 The Parliament of Mongolia on February 3, 2000 passed the ‘Law of Mongolia on its nuclear-
weapon-free status’, and on September 17th, 2012, the Permanent Representatives to the United 
Nations of the f ive Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) – the US, Russia, China, United Kingdom and 
France – and the Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations signed parallel 
political declarations regarding Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status (Nuclear Threat Initiative 
2013). See also Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (2010) for the comprehensive review 
of Mongolia’s negotiation for a nuclear-weapon-free status.
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Fortunate Neighbours, Unfortunate Neighbours
Neighbour is a key metaphor in Christian moral philosophy, which has 
recently been taken on board to imagine a cosmopolitan world in which 
people are urged to treat immigrants, strangers, and other non-natives as 
neighbours whom we are obliged to love: ‘love thy neighbour!’ (Derrida 
2004). The central attraction of neighbour lies in the idea of proximity 
which is expected to overcome enmity. However, paradoxically, neighbourly 
proximity is both an end and a means, for the concept of neighbour can be 
instrumentalized to serve a political purpose. The US ‘Good Neighbour’ 
policy was a prime example of the strategic use for assembling alliances, 
as it was designed to promote non-intervention and friendship with its 
southerly neighbours, and to secure Latin American support against the 
looming threat posed by Germany in the 1930s.3
The People’s Republic of China has, since the 1950s, adopted a similar 
good neighbourly policy; inspired by the American model, but also rooted in 
traditional metaphor of neighbours being as close as lips and teeth (chunchi 
xiangyi 唇齿相依), it has been used to put moral injunction on China’s 
neighbouring countries, emphasizing common interest (Lin 2005). In 2003, 
China broadened the scope of its good neighbour policy, pledging to promote 
an ‘amicable, peaceful, and prosperous neighbourhood’ at the same time 
proclaiming China’s ‘peaceful rise’. The two extra dimensions to the original 
idea of good neighbour (mu lin 睦邻) – peaceful neighbour (an lin 安邻) and 
rich neighbour ( fu lin 富邻) (Yang 2004) – are no doubt designed to enhance 
China’s own prestige by placating China’s neighbours (Tsai et al. 2011) .
The moral conception of proximate neighbourhood, I argue, is imbed-
ded in sedentary metaphysics as exemplif ied in the wise saying: ‘You can 
choose your friends, but you can’t choose your neighbours’. The trouble is, 
as Slavoj Žižek (2005) shows, hatred and killing often occur between close 
neighbours. In Bosnia, the concept of neighbourhood called komš iluk has 
become ambivalent, as it is torn between culturally expected intimate social-
ity and the murderous tensions among people in the same neighbourhood 
divided along ethnic lines (Bringa 1993, Henig 2012, Sorabji 2008). One may 
argue that proximity does not necessarily always lead to friendship; rather, 
3 In order to assuage the fears of Latin Americans, on March 4th, 1933, Roosevelt announced 
in his inaugural address that: ‘In the f ield of World policy, I would dedicate this nation to the 
policy of the good neighbour, the neighbour who resolutely respects himself and, because he 
does so, respects the rights of others, the neighbour who respects his obligations and respects 
the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbours’ (Roosevelt 1933).
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precisely because of overlapping interests, maintaining a boundary between 
neighbours may be diff icult but existentially essential. As Jacques-Alain 
Miller writes perceptively, ‘For it is a simple matter to love one’s neighbour 
when he is distant, but it is a different matter in proximity’ (Miller 1994: 79-80).
Conceptualized this way, geopolitics of neighbourhood can be the defining 
characteristic of a nation’s foreign relations. Dana Cuff, in writing about the 
f igure of the neighbour in suburban America, notes that the neighbour is 
both spatial and social. It is also ‘political’ in the sense of Carl Schmitt, which 
requires our wisdom to make a good distinction between a good and a bad 
neighbour (Cuff 2005, Schmitt 1996 [1932]). If we follow Mao Zedong, then, 
choosing to live with the right neighbour against the bad neighbour might be 
seen as the answer to one’s survival and well-being.4 As shown by Mongolia’s 
conceptualization of China and Russia as equal neighbours (so as to avoid 
conflicts) and those beyond as third neighbours (to ‘soft-balance’ the first two 
neighbours), the figure of neighbour has a built-in paradox of both the political 
and the anti-political. It may be both the problem and the solution to it.
Mongolia’s third neighbour conceptualization, as I will analyze below, 
shows that peaceful coexistence of peoples and countries as neighbours lies 
as much in moral injunction as in having a freedom to choose neighbours, 
thereby reassembling a new neighbourhood. To the extent that Mongolia 
actively invites a cluster of nations and international institutions into 
Mongolia as third neighbours to flank the two territorial neighbours, we are 
witnessing a radical geopolitical reconfiguration of Inner Asia, transforming 
Mongolia from a hermit state landlocked between two mutually exclusive 
rival superpowers, to a nation sitting at the centre of a world community 
of neighbours in the making. This is in large part a product of Mongolia’s 
own diplomatic initiatives.
The Mongolian approach may be best explained by Bruno Latour’s 
sociology of translation, in which the aggregation of groups is the target of 
explanation, as opposed to what he calls sociology of the social which takes 
groups as a starting point (Latour 2005). As such, what we need to do is to 
explain how Mongolia has tried to reassemble a new omni-neighbourhood 
in Mongolia, whether a new cosmo-polity is emerging in Mongolia, and what 
characteristics it may have.
Latour’s sociology of translation suggests that an association or group 
is not always comprised only of humans. Non-humans can also play an 
4 ‘Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the f irst importance for 
the revolution. The basic reason why all previous revolutionary struggles in China achieved so 
little was their failure to unite with real friends in order to attack real enemies’ (Mao 1925: 249).
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equal role, exercising agency. I think it is an important insight useful for 
understanding the formation of new neighbourhood in Mongolia, but we 
must at the same time reject Latour’s f lat ontology. For not all things have 
the same weight in their exercise of agency, nor do people have equal power 
or status. Context, history, and culture determine the shape, duration, and 
meaningfulness that each association or neighbourhood takes.
Giovanni da Col (2012), in a recent article in which he develops a concept 
of cosmoeconomics, argues that Tibetan cultural and social life is centred 
on fortune, or yang, and managing one’s fortune is ‘the elementary form 
of fortunate life (da Col 2012: 192). Fortune is the vital force of either an 
individual or a group, but it is perforce to be shared: ‘Good fortune has to 
be shared and redistributed properly and is the medium that connects, 
shapes, and re-creates social networks through the economies it entails. 
But it requires constant care to avoid free-riders and parasites’ (da Col 2012: 
192). Put differently, too much fortune may, like a piece of rotten meat, 
attract a lot of f lies, making you unfortunate. I build on this argument and 
suggest that fortune and its sharing or unsharing may lead to regrouping 
and formations of new political associations.
While da Col’s fortune is something invisible, unquantif iable, and yet 
has a ‘quasi-relational materiality’ as it can be preserved, contained, or 
appropriated, and it can flee or disappear of its own volition due to external 
influence, and such as it is a generalized fortune, I would like to focus on 
something specif ic to locality that may contain the fortune that makes the 
people of the locality particularly fortunate and prosperous, and yet pre-
cisely because of this quality it is subject to desire from outsiders. I call it the 
fortune-sovereignty of the people inhabiting the territory. My conception 
of fortune-sovereignty goes beyond the Eurocentric and modernist under-
standing of sovereignty as something exclusive with a bounded essence; 
fortune-sovereignty not only posits relationality, often hierarchical and 
overlapping, but involves exchanges of fortunes between various sovereign 
realms that result in regional dynamics.5 The best term that captures this 
sense of fortune-sovereignty is the Chinese concept of fangwu (方物) which 
refers to things specif ic to a region. Fangwu, in Chinese conception, is both 
cosmoeconomic and cosmopolitical.
5 Aihwa Ong has recently put forward a similar concept of ‘graduated sovereignty’ to under-
stand the distributed, non-exclusive characteristics of East Asian state sovereign power between 
the centre and special economic zones, where the citizenship is def ined differently according 
to race, ethnicity, gender, class and region, and where foreign corporations are allowed in to 
exercise certain authority (Ong 2006). 
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Take for example the classical Chinese schema of tianxia (天下). It is 
a f ive or nine concentric circle of peoples whose degree of humanity or 
civilization is measured by a gradation of distance from the centre.6 It is in 
practice a combination of political authority and economic fortune; that is, 
the prestige and authority of the centre must be sustained by tribute bearing 
from the periphery. The tributary items – fangwu – from the periphery are 
not just symbolic, but represent the fortune-sovereignty of the realm; in 
return the peripheral leaders get more value-added goods as gifts, i.e. the 
fortune-sovereignty from the emperor’s realm, but political subordination 
to the supreme authority of the centre. James Hevia comes close to capturing 
the essence of the cosmopolitics of this fortune-sovereignty:
[T]ribute is glossed in Chinese-language sources as local products 
( fangwu), that is, things specif ic to the kingdom of the ruler who pre-
sented them to the emperor. The emperor, in turn, bestowed things from 
his kingdom on the other ruler. This exchange of precious objects was 
understood to forge a political relationship between the Qing emperor, 
as the superior, and the other ruler, as inferior, the purpose of which was 
nothing less than the mutual undertaking of the cosmic-moral ordering 
of the world. The objects themselves and their specif ic movements, I 
would argue, cannot be reduced purely to economic or cultural values. 
Rather, they are performative gestures in that they had a role in producing 
political and even natural relations. (Hevia 2003: 15-16)7
6  The Chinese classic Rites of Zhou ranked nine domains of imperial administration starting 
from the residence of the ruler, with required service specif ied in the tributary relations: (The 
ruler) distinguished between the nine domains or areas of service ( fu 服) among the vassal 
states. The area covering one thousand li (from the emperor) is called the Royal Capital Domain 
(Wangji 王畿). The area f ive hundred li beyond the Royal Capital Domain is the area called the 
Marquis Area of Service (Houfu 侯服). The area f ive hundred li beyond the Marquis Area of 
Service is the area called the Master of the Hinterland Area of Service (Dianfu 甸服). The area 
f ive hundred li beyond the Master of the Hinterland Area of Service is the area called the Baron 
Area of Service (Nanfu 男服). The area f ive hundred li beyond the Baron Area of Service is the 
area called the Pledged Off icial Area of Service (Caifu 采服). The area f ive hundred li beyond 
the Pledged Off icial Area of Service is the area called the Guard Area of Service (Weifu 卫服). 
The area f ive hundred li beyond the Guard Area of Service is the area called the Man Barbarian 
Off icial Area of Service (Manfu 蛮服). The area f ive hundred li beyond the Man Barbarian 
Off icial Area of Service is the area called the Yi Barbarian Off icial Area of Service (Yifu 夷服). 
The area f ive hundred li beyond the Yi Barbarian Off icial Area of Service is the area called 
Defense Commander Area of Service (Zhenfu 镇服). Lastly, the area f ive hundred li beyond the 
Defense Commander Area of Service is the Barbarian Border Off icial Area of Service (Fanfu 
藩服) (Quoted in Anderson 2007: 22).
7 See also Hevia (1995: 128-130).
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This schema is predicated on the abundance of China’s fortune-sovereignty, 
a vital force that China often had to share with non-Chinese peoples, albeit 
in attempted exchange for the latter’s political loyalty and subordination. 
This sharing of the fortune-sovereignty was often a dangerous undertaking, 
for often the peripheral peoples would attempt to conquer and occupy China 
in part or in whole, turning China’s ‘cherished men from afar’ into ‘perilous 
neighbours’ (Barf ield 1989). The history of China oscillates between these 
two sets of dynamics: on the one hand, the Chinese imperial imperative 
determines centripetalism, as its centrality must be sustained by tribute-
bearing from the periphery, which must be beckoned and cherished. On 
the other hand, it builds up walls to protect itself from so-called ‘greedy’ 
nomadic neighbours (di Cosmo 1994) whose tribute-making became a way 
to exploit China, as they tried to wrestle more in the missions. There were 
times when peripheral leaders were told not to come to pay tribute, and 
China engaged in active defence by building walls, or expelling ‘barbarians’. 
What it implies is that, I argue, China’s fortune-sovereignty – its specif ic 
material abundance – had the potential to become the source of its misfor-
tune, the aversion of which requiring astute management. The management 
of fortune-sovereignty is the elementary form of the Chinese cosmopolitics.
The geoeconomic and cosmopolitical perspectives as outlined above can 
perhaps explain Mongolia’s transformation from a conquest people to one 
looking inward to defend themselves. I argue that it was this transforma-
tion that brought China to become Mongolia’s ‘perilous neighbour’, and 
making Mongolia lose its own capacity to be China’s worthy neighbour. 
In other words, I suggest that a neighbour is not an individual or group 
that is territorially close to someone fortuitously. To be a neighbour is to 
be oriented to someone’s fortune-sovereignty, thereby becoming a force to 
be reckoned with.
What, then, is the fortune-sovereignty of Mongolia? I have elsewhere 
argued that during the Qing era, the Mongols were largely kept separate 
from the Chinese with the Great Wall and the Willow Palisade serving 
as their borders. The Mongols’ nationalist involution was therefore the 
product of the Qing management of the Mongols, who were given a sense 
of territorial boundary, which they were to defend (Bulag 2012b). Moreover, 
the Mongols were given to develop a sense that their land was rich, as 
there emerged a plethora of place names with the word ‘bayan’, wealthy 
or rich: bayangol, bayanhot, bayanbogd, bayantsagaan, bayanhongor. Like 
the Tibetans, Mongols began to think in terms of fortune, heshig, which 
is located in pastures, mountains or rivers or lakes (for studies of Mongol 
practice of beckoning or increasing one’s fortune, see Chabros [1992], 
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Empson [2011], Humphrey and Ujeed [2012]). Mongols began to think that 
they were the most ‘fortunate’ and ‘blessed’ people in the world in terms of 
their material well-being. This was no doubt the product of the Qing policy 
of territorialization of the Mongol banners, their princes being obliged to 
regularly worship mountains and rivers which were believed to be fortune-
providers (Ts. Nasanbaljir 1964).
Such cosmoeconomic transformation had direct bearing on the Mon-
golian cosmopolitical configuration. In the late nineteenth century, there 
emerged legends about golden horses or golden cattle, which, once grazing 
on luscious pastures or swimming under lakes, are either stolen by southern 
barbarians (nanmanzi南蛮子) or Chinese, and occasionally Russians, or 
running away, startled by the strangers. These legends tell of the massive 
arrival of the Chinese and Russian settlers in Mongolia, and Mongol heroic 
defence of their pasture and salt lakes (Bulag 2010: 167-197, Chen 2001). Such 
legends of loss of fortune-wealth show an irony of Mongolia’s misfortune 
stemming precisely from their rich endowment of natural resources, and the 
Chinese and others turning from a victim fleeing Mongols to ones settling 
in Mongolia and among the Mongols as aggressive neighbours.
Whether or how to share Mongolia’s fortune-sovereignty with non-
Mongols thus became an existential question for Mongols at the turn of 
the 20th century. I argue that the 20th century Mongolian independence must 
be understood in this new cosmopolitical and cosmoeconomic context, 
which constituted a structure of opportunity, an opportunity for Mongolia 
to exercise its agency to form its own polity. By structure of opportunity I 
mean that these expansive powers were all mutually exclusive, all wanting 
to encompass Mongolia into their own polity, either formally or informally. 
I have recently developed a concept called ‘collaborative nationalism’ 
to capture the characteristics and dynamics of Mongolian nationalism 
(Bulag 2010). Mongol nationalism, that is a desire to build a nation-state on 
historical Mongolia, was waged through bringing in and forming a united 
front with a third party against a major adversary. In triangulating the 
relationship, the Mongols developed agential capacity to judge and decide 
how to use their fortune both to cut networks and build new ones.
My point of collaborative nationalism is that nationalism is not always a 
practice of bowling alone, to use Robert D. Putnam’s (2008) apt phrase, but 
is often collaborative with putative friends against putative enemies, and 
the biggest challenge to collaborative nationalism is how to manage the 
shared fortune-sovereignty with the friends in the absence of the enemies 
after they are defeated. Indeed, in the twentieth century, Mongols suf-
fered more in the hands of their Soviet Russian friends than their enemies, 
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Chinese or Japanese. Most of Mongolia’s leaders were killed by the Soviet 
Russians. The Soviet Union stationed a massive army in the 1930s and 40s, 
and from 1966 to 1991, and operated secret uranium mines and railways. This 
friendship was both necessary and hugely costly, and it was even colonial, 
not because of the inherent evilness of the Russians, but because of the 
strategic necessity of collaborative nationalism. Mongols have to share 
their fortune-sovereignty with a friend in order to avoid the possibility 
of its complete loss in the hands of an adversary, who was perceived to 
represent ‘threat’, rather than simply ‘power’, according to the ‘balance of 
threat’ theory proposed by Stephen Walt (1985).
Since the 1920s, Mongolian politicians have been attracted to the Swit-
zerland model to maintain neutrality, but this has never been a real option. 
From the early sixties, landlocked, exploited by the Soviet Union, and yet 
deeply suspicious of China, Mongolia embarked on a road to international-
ize itself by joining the UN and establishing diplomatic relations with as 
many countries as possible (Altangerel et al. 2013, Campi and Baasan 2009): 
another round of collaborative nationalism.
As is clear, Mongolian collaborative nationalism is not just relational, but 
also organizational, as it aims to form partnerships, and it is as strategic 
as it is f lexible, depending on the Mongol judgment of the f luctuating 
qualities of its territorial and non-territorial neighbours, such as their 
aggregate strength, geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and 
offensive intentions. One may argue that f lexibility is not necessarily a 
monopolistic property of late capitalist accumulation as David Harvey 
(1989: 141-172), or Chinese negotiation with global capitalism in the face of 
political uncertainty as Aihwa Ong (1999) would have it. Flexibility is in 
fact a distinct feature of Mongolian territoriality, and it is the traditional 
mechanism to maintain peace or wage warfare.
Consider the rural Mongolian residential pattern. The smallest residential 
community in Mongolia is called hot ail. This is a partnership community 
with several families congregating to share labour and pasture, forming a 
neighbourhood, called after the shared fortune or property: neg usniihan, 
people of one water source; neg goliinhan, people of one river, and so on. The 
members could be relatives or friends, and the size of the community could 
be constant, as some families move in or out, depending on how they get 
along. The flexibility or possibility of moving away from the neighbourhood 
means Mongols have freedom to decide whom to choose to live next to. 
To be sure, there are as many impossibilities as there are flexibilities, but 
my general point is that Mongols do have a tradition of not only choos-
ing a neighbour or neighbours, but also forming a neighbourhood or an 
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aggregation based on common interest. I call this f lexible neighbourhood. 
Mongols do not bowl alone, but form alignment to confront an adversary 
or venture for a fortune.
My concept of f lexible neighbourhood has the advantage of capturing 
not only the flexible form and size of neighbourhood, but also the agencies 
of actors. To be a member of a neighbourhood, or to rally familial units to 
form a community, one has to have suff icient capital, social or economic, 
and they constitute complementarities thereby achieving an organic unity, 
to use Durkheim’s phrase. This flexibility characterizes social dynamics in 
Mongolian history, especially from the twelfth century to the eighteenth 
century. The Manchu tried to destroy this flexibility mechanism by dividing 
up Mongols along banner lines, but within a banner, f lexibility continued. 
The new spirit of f lexibility is precisely how to work against the f ixed ter-
ritorial grain to form a flexible neighbourhood of nation-states in the world.
Following the cosmoeconomic-cum-cosmopolitical perspectives and 
that of f lexible neighbourhood, I suggest that today, as Mongolia discovers 
world class mines of coal, copper, and gold – the fortune or the source of 
energy vital for Mongolia’s economic rise – a new round of neighbouring is 
now taking place. The proximity of these mines, many of which have been 
declared ‘strategic deposits’ by the Mongolian government in 2007, to the 
Chinese border, and the fact that China is the largest market for these miner-
als, as China needs these resources to energize its own economy, all point 
to the fact that Mongolia’s fortune-sovereignty will have to be shared with 
China as a ‘greedy’ neighbour. How to share this fortune-sovereignty has 
become a question of how to keep Mongolia fortunate; it is also indicative 
of Mongolia’s art of neighbouring.
Reassembling Neighbours in Mine-golia
In spring 1990, Mongolia became the f irst Asian communist country that 
embraced democracy. Quickly Mongolia’s career diplomats, now wearing a 
hat of democracy, went out on a new mission; democracy, as an ideological 
resource, did its magic as an ‘actant’ not only to allow Mongolia to join the 
international community of democracies but also bring them in to form 
Mongolia’s new flexible neighbourhood. Mongolia’s strategy paid off, as 
the US led a group of donor countries to provide Overseas Development 
Assistance to Mongolia.
With China being defined as a neighbour, after normalizing relations in 
1989, Mongolia opened its door for Chinese investment to compensate for 
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the withdrawal of Russian investment. Much of the Chinese capital went 
into small coal mines in Mongolia as Mongolia issued thousands of licenses, 
almost for free, in a bid to attract foreign investment. However, for much of 
the 1990s, despite the in-flowof foreign aid, Mongolia languished in poverty, 
due no small part to, inter alia, the international reputation Mongolia 
enjoyed as a country of pastoral economy, collapse of infrastructure, and 
shortage of skilled labour.
This situation began to improve at the turn of the new millennium, when 
the Canadian company Ivanhoe Mines discovered world class gold-copper 
ore deposits in a place called Oyu Tolgoi, or Turquoise Hill in the Gobi Desert, 
only 80 kilometres from the Chinese border. As more world-class mineral 
deposits were discovered, and international investment poured in, the 
Mongolian government decided to exploit the mine together with Ivanhoe 
and the Anglo-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto exclusively. In 2009 they 
agreed on a 34 percent Mongolian government and 66 percent Ivanhoe and 
Rio Tinto investment deal.
Ivanhoe and Rio Tinto’s entry into Mongolia quickly transformed Mongo-
lia into Mine-golia (Bulag 2009), as minerals have been recognized as the na-
tion’s new fortune-property to make it prosperous. However, the Mongolian 
government’s willingness to allow 66 percent share control by Ivanhoe and 
Rio Tinto happened at a time of heightened nationalist anxiety over China’s 
massive investment in Mongolia. There was a rising anti-China sentiment 
against its perceived threat to Mongolia’s national security (Rossabi 2005). 
I argue that Mongolia’s deal on Oyu Tolgoi followed the logic of ‘collabora-
tive nationalism’, that is to bring in powerful international companies 
from Mongolia’s ‘third neighbours’ to ‘balance’ China’s preponderance of 
investment in small mines, and Russian control of Mongolia’s large copper 
mine of Erdenet. In doing so, Mongolia enacted a political expectation of 
Ivanhoe and Rio Tinto to be different from Chinese companies or Russian 
companies. In other words, the Mongols expected corporations from the 
‘third neighbours’ to demonstrate altruism to Mongolia.
In 2010, Mongolia renewed its 1994 National Security Concept. According 
to Reeves, the renewal was a culmination of gradual shift from an omni-
enmeshment strategy to one of combining omni-enmeshment with balance 
of inf luence, identifying China as Mongolia’s biggest national security 
concern (Reeves 2012). I would add that the new National Security Concept 
has elevated the ‘Third Neighbours’ to the same level as the two territorial 
neighbours, while avoiding a political naivety enshrined in the previous 
conception. Mongolia’s resource nationalistic stance towards Rio Tinto as 
shown in the recent calls for renegotiating the deal represents a belated 
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realization that the ‘Third Neighbours’ may have their own self-interest in 
investment into Mongolia’s vital mineral sectors.
One clause in the new National Security Concept is particularly striking: 
‘External factors which may adversely affect the ensuring of economic 
security: Direct dependence on any one country in economic branches 
of strategic importance’ (Embassy of Mongolia n.d., Chapter 5, article 33). 
This clause is usually interpreted as a ‘one third’ rule, i.e. a proportional 
and equal representation of the three neighbours’ economic interest in 
Mongolia. The rule is thus an indication as much to curb China’s domination 
in Mongolia as a realization of the limited power and indeed the self-interest 
of the third neighbours who may strike better deals with China or Russia 
to the detriment of Mongolia’s national interest, or fall afoul of Mongolia’s 
two territorial neighbours. In 2010 Mongolia put Tavan Tolgoi, the world’s 
second largest coking coal deposit, to international bidding, not limited to 
the ‘third neighbours’ alone. Indeed, ‘third neighbours’ were to be just that, 
‘one third’ in Mongolia’s three-member neighbourhood. In Mongolia’s new 
strategic thinking, the three neighbours must be brought in to achieve some 
kind of equilibrium on which Mongolia’s national sovereignty will rest.
In 2009, shortly before the bidding, three of Russia’s highest leaders 
visited Mongolia in succession: the Prime Minister Putin in May, President 
Medvedev in August, and Speaker of the Upper House, Sergei Mironov, in 
September. In June 2010, the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao visited Mongolia. 
2011 saw an unprecedented number of foreign dignitaries: the President of 
India, Pratiba Davinsingh Patil in July, South Korean president Lee Myung-
bak and US vice president Joe Biden in August, Finnish President Halonen 
August 31st – September 1st, German Chancellor Merkel in mid-October, 
Austrian president Fischer in December, all coming with impressive pack-
ages of offers, all expressing interest in getting a share of Mongolia’s strategic 
fortune-sovereignty – coking coal.
As Mongolian politicians calculated correctly, suddenly Mongolia 
became a major destination for world leaders, as many of them have taken 
up on the Mongolian coal rush. The Mongolian government’s strategy of 
assembling a world community of neighbours through its one-third rule 
can be gauged in its choice of the international bidders for the Tavan Tolgoi 
Mine in 2011: China’s Shenhua was given 40 percent, America’s Peabody 24 
percent and a Russia-Mongolia consortium 36 percent. More interestingly, 
apart from America’s Peabody, the other two entities were not singles, but 
each being a consortium itself: The Russian-led consortium included South 
Korea’s POSCO, utility f irm KEPCO, trading f irm LG Corp and Daewoo 
International, state-owned Russian Railways and Japanese trading houses 
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Itochu Corp, Sumitomo Corp, Marubeni Corp and Sojitz Corp. China’s 
consortium comprised China’s Shenhua and Japan’s Mitsui & Co. This was 
an omni-enmeshment plus interlocking of interests indeed. Surprisingly, 
the Mongolian National Security Council vetoed the deal immediately after 
other South Korean and Japanese bidders cried foul. The rejection was not 
so much a negation of the intention of balancing as a collision between 
rigidity of the new security concept and the pragmatics on the ground. The 
search for bidders continues at this time of writing.
The Mongolian state’s strategy can also be seen in the construction of 
new railway lines to ship the mineral products to the world markets. As 
a land-locked nation, Mongolia does not have its own sea port; its nearest 
port is China’s Tianjin. Since both Oyu Tolgoi copper mine and Tavan Tolgoi 
coal mine are located near the Chinese border, which could be accessed by 
building a two hundred kilometre long narrow-gauge (1,435mm) railway 
from the mines to link to the existing Chinese railway network, it has been 
an option strongly favoured by all the mainstream international experts and 
f inancial institutions, including the World Bank and the Asia Development 
Bank. After prolonged debates, in December 2010, the Mongolian parliament 
resolved to construct a 1,100 kilometre-long internal wide-gauge (1,520mm) 
railway line in the f irst phase, and it was to link to the Trans-Mongolian 
railway and further east to connect to the Russian railway system and the 
Russian Far Eastern ports of Vanino or Vostochnii, in order to ship Mongo-
lia’s minerals to its two close third neighbours, South Korea and Japan. As 
Munkh-Ochir, a Mongolian defence strategist writes, ‘This decision seems 
to reflect a cohort of other-than-economic considerations – geopolitical 
calculations, aspirations for sustainable industrialization, and finally public 
opinion, which matters as the new electoral cycle unfolds’ (Dorjjugder 2010).
Mongolia’s national strategy on railway construction was political; as 
such it seemingly trumped all the economic rationality. It was a reaction to 
the Chinese government’s shutdown of the railway at the Sino-Mongolian 
port of Erlian in 2002 for several days during the visit of the Dalai Lama to 
Mongolia, ostensibly for ‘technical reasons’. In this light, precisely because 
of the unpredictability of the Chinese government which often uses its 
economic muscle for international relations, Mongolia’s political decision 
also has had its economic calculation not to become hostage to China, 
but always allow for an alternative exit. Yet in line with Mongolia’s overall 
strategy, the railway decision must not be construed as shunning China, for 
China is and will be Mongolia’s largest market. Indeed, Chinese capital is 
eagerly sought for building the new planned railways. On October 24th, 2014, 
after four years of gruelling, and oftentimes debilitating, debates with high 
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pressure from both China and Russia, the Parliament of Mongolia approved 
the construction of four railway lines: two railway lines to be linked to the 
Chinese railway system will use the narrow gauge, and the other two – a 
line from the Mongolian copper city Erdenet to the Mongolia-Russian border 
into Tuva, and the planned horizontal line of the Mongolian national railway 
network from the mineral-rich South Gobi to the east, will use the wide 
gauge (Parliament of Mongolia 2014).
As can be seen, China is actively invited in, but the proportion of the 
Chinese share of Mongolia’s fortune-sovereignty will be equalized with 
its other territorial neighbour, Russia. This is exemplary of Mongolia’s new 
strategy of building a world community of neighbours par excellence.
It remains to be seen whether Mongolia’s neighbourhood strategy will 
work eventually, but what is clear is that Mongolia’s art of neighbouring 
with China is through assembling as many neighbours as possible, inviting 
them into Mongolia. This situation is somewhat reminiscent of the Chinese 
tianxia and the tributary system. Like an ancient and wealthy agrarian 
Chinese empire, a mineral-rich Mongolia is now receiving tribute-like mis-
sions from powerful countries, all wanting to make profit out of it. Unlike 
the Chinese emperor who wanted to capitalize on the tributary missions 
to enhance his own prestige as the supreme lord of universe, Mongolian 
leaders’ ambition is perhaps more mundane, that is, they want to transform 
these potential threats into forces that can ultimately guarantee Mongolia’s 
sovereign survival and economic prosperity. This is to be achieved not only 
through a delicate balancing act, keeping all of them at equal distance or 
closeness, but also through sharing its fortune-sovereignty with all of them, 
and f inding a mechanism to interlock all of their interests together, rather 
than pitting them against one another.
Cosmoeconomics of ‘Horspitality’, or How To Be Happy 
Neighbours?
On November 21st, 2005, the US president Bush came to Ulaanbaatar to 
thank Mongolia for its staunch support for the U.S. war effort in Iraq, and 
particularly to thank the Mongol soldiers for intercepting suicide bombers 
at the gate of a US military camp, saving hundreds of US soldiers. ‘This 
visit has historical signif icance because it proves that Mongolia has a third 
neighbour’, Mongolian president Enkhbayar said as he introduced Bush (The 
Washington Times 2005). ‘America is proud to call you the third neighbour’, 
Bush responded (2005). A better and more appropriate response would 
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have been ‘America is proud to be your third neighbour’, but never mind 
Bushisms. This was the f irst time that the US off icially and openly accepted 
Mongolia’s formula and acknowledged a neighbourly relationship between 
them, 15 years after James Baker f irst proposed so to Mongolia. Neighbours 
in need, neighbours indeed.
In his address to the Mongolian parliament, Bush said he had a second 
mission, ‘I’m here on an important international mission. Secretary Rums-
feld asked me to check on his horse’ (Bush 2005). He referred to a diplomatic 
gift horse8 given to Rumsfeld by the Mongolian Ministry of Defence during 
his visit just a month prior to Bush’s visit. Instead of taking the horse back 
to the States, Rumsfeld left it in Mongolia, and it was left in the wild to roam 
freely. The American press at the time was amused, if not embarrassed, not 
so much at the seemingly worthless Mongol gift, as at the possible indication 
of the US desperation to rely on a small and poor nation with a belligerent 
history of war.
A Mongolian horse, a common species, is certainly far less impressive 
than some rare species, such as panda, as a diplomatic gift to show one 
country’s good will (for an in-depth discussion of animal-human neigh-
bourly relations in the Chinese context, see Fiskesjö, this volume). I suspect 
Mongolian diplomats did a poor job in explaining the real signif icance of 
a gift horse apart from emphasizing that the given horse is a pure breed 
or a champion horse in a national naadam competition. Still less did they 
possibly explain why the horse ought to be kept in Mongolia instead of 
taking away.
Rumsfeld was not the f irst to get a Mongolian horse. When the Japanese 
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, the f irst national leader of a democratic coun-
try arrived for a visit in early August 1991, the Mongols gave him a horse.9 
Less than two weeks later, when the Chinese president Yang Shangkun 
came for a visit, Mongols also gave him a horse. Neither of them took away 
the horses. A more recent American politician to get a horse was the US 
vice president Biden in 2011.10 A US journalist called Evan Osnos wrote a 
piece entitled ‘Equine Diplomacy’ on The New Yorker, complaining that the 
Mongols had even given gift-horses to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev and 
the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. Moreover, he claimed that he 
failed in his self-appointed mission to f ind Rumself’s horse, writing: ‘As for 
8 Rumsfeld named it Montana, after his wife’s home state which resembles Mongolian steppe. 
9 He named the horse Kaishun. Kai is from his family name and Shun is from Japanese word 
Shunme that means f leet horse.
10 Biden named the horse ‘Celtic’, after his Irish origins.
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Rumsfeld’s horse, I never found him. By the end of my trip, the [Mongolian] 
defence ministry told me that the horse was back in Khentii province, 
birthplace of Genghis Khan. I was welcome to keep looking for him in the 
province, an area the size of Austria’ (Osnos 2011).11
The former Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu was far more gracious in his 
appreciation of the horse he received. In August 2006, at a ceremony mark-
ing the 800th anniversary of the founding of Chinggis’s Great Mongolia in 
1206, which I also attended, I heard Kaifu reminiscing how he still checked 
on his Mongolian horse through the Japanese embassy. In October 2011, 
the newly appointed Japanese Ambassador Takenori Shimizu to Mongolia 
paid a courtesy call on Kaifu, and Kaifu started his conversation with his 
Mongolian horse:
At the time of that visit, I was deeply impressed by a gift horse I received 
from the then President Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat. That was a prized horse 
that had won in Naadam (the national sports festival of Mongolia). I heard 
that in Mongolia, a horse is a really considerable gift. However, although 
I was very grateful, I had no place to keep the horse if I brought it back to 
Japan, so I thought it would be very unfortunate for the horse. Therefore, 
when I returned I just brought back its reins. (Japan News 2011)
He also recalled how he was deeply impressed by the Mongolian ‘emotional 
intelligence’:
My visit to Mongolia was the f irst as Prime Minister of Japan and it was 
also the f irst by a leader from the West after democratization, so it was 
an extremely good thing. When I visited the country again some years 
later, I was eating a meal at a restaurant when I could hear a horse’s cry. 
As I was wondering what was happening, I saw that Kaishun, my horse, 
had been brought to me by the people taking care of him. I was once again 
deeply moved by the consideration for me. I thought that this could truly 
be called heart-to-heart communication. The people of Mongolia have 
strong compassion, or perhaps I should say an emotional heart. I think 
their mentality is similar to that of Japanese people. (Japan News 2011).
11 The latest to get a Mongolian gift horse was the US secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel in April 
2014. Helen Cooper, a New York Times journalist covering Hagel’s visit, wrote that the American 
fatigue at receiving equine gifts from Mongolia was largely for logistical reasons. They left their 
horses back in Mongolia because they wouldn’t want American taxpayers to bear the cost of 
their upkeep (Cooper 2014). 
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I am not sure that Kaifu really understood Mongolian mentality; what he 
exhibited was perhaps more of his own mentality. The signif icance of the 
gift horse must be examined both historically and in the way Mongols 
conceptualize the human-animal relationship. Historically, horses were 
Mongol ‘local products’ presented to the Qing emperor as an obligatory 
tribute. In 1655, the Qing granted zasag (ruling prince) titles to eight princes 
of the Khalkha, and demanded that the Khalkha make an annual tribute 
of one white camel and eight white horses to the Qing emperor. The offer-
ing of nine whites was institutionalized in 1691 when the Khalkha f inally 
submitted to the Qing (Bawden 1989 [1968]: 102). Thus, viewed historically, 
presenting a horse gift is not an innocent, but profoundly cosmopolitical 
act. In other words, during the Qing dynasty, the Mongol submission was 
annually expressed by surrendering the fortune-sovereignty in exchange 
for gifts – the fortune-sovereignty of the emperor – and trade rights.
The practice of presenting a gift horse to a guest and leaving it behind 
in the wild has a more cosmoeconomic dimension. It is usually the case 
that the Mongols create a specif ic relation between a person or family and 
an animal. In creating this association, this individual animal undergoes 
a consecration ritual called seter, which means henceforth, this particular 
animal is sanctif ied, never to be drafted for labour or killed for food (for a 
brief description of seter, see (Hyer and Jagchid 1983: 88-89). In consecrating 
the animal, it is believed that the fortune of both the owner and his animals 
of the same species will increase. As Tani writes, hunters and herders ‘justify 
their killing and consumption of animals by prohibiting the slaughter of 
a special individual held to be responsible for the herds’ prosperity’ (Tani 
1996: 45). Fortune or heshig may be present everywhere and among all, but 
it is through identif ication through naming and setting free an animal that 
one secures his or her own individualized fortune. Thus, I would argue that 
presenting the gift-horse is precisely an act to share Mongolia’s fortune-
sovereignty with the honoured guest, so that his fortune may also multiply. 
Presenting a horse and performing the seter is indexical to the Mongol sense 
of fortune and happiness. With the fortune of Rumsfeld and Biden, and that 
of Kaifu ever accumulating in Mongolia, it is hoped that Mongolia and its 
third neighbours will not only share Mongolia’s fortune-sovereignty, but 
also share happiness together.
As we have seen, the Japanese Prime Minister had an emotional reunion 
with his gift horse f ifteen years later. Since his retirement from politics 
in 2009, Kaifu has been serving as President of the Japan Mongolia Cross 
Link Association. In October 2011, Rumsfeld also came back to Mongolia, 
to ‘thank the country for their outsized contributions to theUS-led Global 
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War on Terror and to promote stronger ties between the US and Mongolia’ 
(American Chamber of Commerce in Mongolia 2011). During the occa-
sion, the Mongols brought back his Montana from the steppe for a reunion 
with his master (Rumsfeld Off ice 2011). It is said that the Soviet leader 
Leonid Brezhnev took away his Mongolian gift horse immediately, so it 
was probably never consecrated with a seter. As for the Chinese president 
Yang Shangkun’s horse, it was kept in Mongolia until 2002 when it was 
sent to China, four years after Yang’s death. A neighbour that shares 
fortune-sovereignty, but refuses or does not know how to share happiness, 
is inherently unfortunate.
Smart Power and Pax-Mongolica in the 21st Century
I have so far discussed the geopolitical reconfiguration of neighbourhood 
between Mongolia and China through changing fortune; the reverse of 
fortune has turned China from a passive neighbour to an active neighbour, 
from a neighbour that repeatedly tried to wall itself against invaders or 
expel the conquerors to one that began to actively expand into Mongolia. 
The closing in of external powers in addition to China as a result of the 
reverse of Mongolia’s fortune, created a situation not entirely unfavourable 
to Mongolia, however. To the extent that Mongolia’s neighbourhood build-
ing aims to create a new security structure so that Mongolia’s economic 
prosperity and national sovereignty are guaranteed, we need to examine 
what measures Mongolia has taken towards that end. Indeed, Mongolia’s 
geopolitical environment is unadmirable. With a border of 4,710 kilometres 
with China, but less than 20,000 troops in total, China could occupy Mon-
golia within a day if it wanted to. Mongolia has every good reason to fear 
a rising China, not least because, for the greater part of their interactive 
history, China had suffered in the hands of the Mongols repeated loss of 
territory, people and even death of state (wang guo 亡国). It is now the turn 
of the Mongols to fear the worst, for there is still a powerful undercurrent 
in China to regard Mongolia as a breakaway territory by virtue of China’s 
claim to be a successor state to the Qing Empire, of which Mongolia was 
once an important part (Bulag 2012a). In this regard, then, ‘China threat’ 
is not something entirely new, and an assertive China is, to Mongolia, not 
a sudden change from a sleeping beauty to an awakened roaring lion. How 
to deal with such a neighbour is, as we have seen, the core of Mongolia’s 
national security consideration and constitutes the essence of Mongolia’s 
international diplomacy.
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However, if Mongolia’s persistent and eventually successful pursuit of 
‘single-State nuclear free zone’ is any indication, Mongolia’s approach to its 
national security is precisely through peace promotion. In the 1990s, Mongo-
lia pre-empted the China threat by renouncing territorial pan-Mongolism, 
deciding not to support Inner Mongols in their struggle for independence. 
Mongolia was also lucky during the period, because China adopted Deng 
Xiaoping’s dictum of self-restraint (taoguang yanghui 韬光养晦) in its 
foreign policy, aiming to create a safe international environment for its 
economic development. While both sides intensif ied their commitment to 
good neighbourly posture, at the turn of the new millennium, Mongolia’s 
geopolitical environment had fundamentally changed.
One of the important developments at the beginning of the 21st century 
was the formation of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 
2001, comprising China, Russia, and four of the f ive Central Asian republics: 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Both China and Russia 
actively encouraged Mongolia to be a member. Mongolia is attracted to the 
SCO principle that emphasizes ‘mutual respect of sovereignty, independ-
ence, territorial integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, non-
aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force or threat of 
its use in international relations, seeking no unilateral military superiority 
in adjacent areas (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 2006) But it is also 
acutely aware that the SCO is intended as a rival to the US-dominated NATO, 
and it excludes most of Mongolia’s third neighbours. Thus, Mongolia only 
applied for an observer status, refusing to join it as a member.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US and the subsequent US war in Iraq 
and Afghanistan offered an opportunity for Mongolia to get out of this 
straightjacket. Responding to the US call, Mongolia joined the US-led ‘coali-
tion of the willing’ to disarm Saddam Hussein, and contributed to the UN 
peace-keeping operations. More recently, on November 21st, 2012, Mongolia 
became the 57th participating state of the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation (2012) in Europe, in which it has been active since 2004. 
Mongolia’s active participation in the international collective military 
operation is an effort to secure and develop its position in the world by 
extricating itself from the Chinese and Russian spheres of influence, and as 
such it is exemplary of small states who ‘are more likely to use international 
organizations as their preferred foreign policy tool (Hey 2003: 4)
While this may be the intention of any small state faced with a security 
threat, what needs to be explained in our case is the ability of Mongo-
lia as a small and weak state to attract its third neighbours to value its 
contribution and consider it as a worthy neighbour. In the absence of any 
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military strength, paradoxically, Mongolia’s military contribution cannot 
be assessed in terms of hard power, but only in terms of soft power, which, 
in Joseph Nye’s original formulation is, ‘the ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion or payments. Further, it arises 
from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies 
to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments 
(Nye 2004: 10). This is not a moment to make a list of Mongolia’s soft power; 
what I am interested in is whether Mongolia has ‘smart power’ to build a 
neighbourhood of peace.
Since 2001, an annual military exercise called Khan Quest has been 
organized in Mongolia by the Mongolian Armed Forces General Staff in 
conjunction with the US Pacif ic Command (PACOM). China and Russia 
responded to the American entry into Mongolia by launching their f irst 
joint military exercise since their alliance in Far East Russia’s Vladivostok 
and in China’s Shandong Peninsula from August 8 to 25, 2005. The US 
Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld and President Bush’s visits to Mongolia in 
October and November in the same year were not just to express the US 
appreciation for Mongolia’s steadfast support to the US war effort, but also 
to warn China and Russia to stay away from Mongolia. However, although 
Bush told a Mongolian reporter that the US would help Mongolia under 
military threat, saying ‘We will support our allies for sure if a war cannot 
be avoided’, a week after his visit, the Mongolian president paid an off icial 
visit to China. A China-Mongolia joint statement in Beijing declared that 
neither party would participate in any military-political alliance directed 
against each other and would not conclude any treaty and agreement with 
a third country that may adversely affect the interests of each other (United 
Daily News 2005:13).
Whatever the US intention, Mongolia has faithfully stuck to its Concept 
of Foreign Policy and its Concept of National Security adopted in 1994 that 
Mongolia would not provide a military base to any foreign country, and 
it would pursue a policy of non-alignment. The 1994 National Security 
Concept stated that Mongolia’s ‘military-political security can be ensured 
through a collective security system by joint efforts or participation in such 
a system’. What Mongolia had in mind was to transform its defence force 
into the international peace support and UN peacekeeping operations – a 
total internationalization of Mongolia’s national defence.
In 2002 the Mongolian Parliament passed legislation that regulates par-
ticipation of Mongolian military and civilian police personnel in UN peace 
operations. In 2006, against the tough joint Chinese and Russian military 
response, Mongolia deftly established a Peacekeeping Training Centre as 
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part of their Five Hills Training Facility, and launched an expanded military 
exercise involving 22 Asia-Pacif ic countries. Mongolia thereby became 
the f irst country in the region to organize a multinational peace support 
operations Command Post Exercise as well as Field Training Exercise with 
the Global Peace Operations Initiative of the US government. In 2007, the 
participants included Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, the 
Philippines and Tonga, as well as Mongolia and the US.
In addition, since 2004, Mongolia has held annual bilateral military ex-
ercises with India, the so-called ‘spiritual third neighbour’ of Mongolia, and 
has called the exercise Nomadic Elephant since 2007. Since 2008 Mongolia 
and Russia have held annual anti-terror military exercises in Mongolia, and 
China and Mongolia began joint military exercises in 2009.
An important feature of all these military exercises is that the US, Russia, 
China, and India all have provided and continue to provide military aid to 
Mongolia. While each of these countries tries to draw Mongolia into its own 
orbit, Mongolia has steadfastly refused to provide military a base to any of 
its neighbours. Yet, at the same time, Mongolia has opened up and turned 
itself into a military public, creating a cosmopolitical space. In other words, 
Mongolia has brought in all the interested military neighbours, not to target 
any other neighbour, but for mutual understanding. The military exercises 
are to enhance Mongolia’s ability to contribute to global peace keeping opera-
tions, on the premise that, according to John C.K. Daly, ‘collective security 
is the best guarantor of military protection for small states’ (Daly 2008).
Today, maintaining a small army of about 10,000 troops, Mongolia does 
not appear to have enemies in the neighbourhood, and its national defence 
is predicated on global peace-keeping, not f ighting any national adversary. 
Seven hundred years after the collapse of the Mongol Empire, Mongols have 
come back to build a new pax Mongolica, not through war-mongering, but 
through peacekeeping.
Conclusion: the Centrality of Mongolia in the Assembled 
Neighbourhood
The renowned world systems specialist Andre Gunder Frank (1992) once 
emphasized the centrality of Mongolia or Central Asia in shapingworld his-
tory. I suggest that we look at contemporary Mongolia’s relations with China 
also in terms of a world system, rather than purely within the framework 
of ‘international relations’. If in the past, the nomadic Huns and Mongols 
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shaped the world by bursting out of the steppe and inserting themselves 
on other peoples through conquest, today, a tiny country is reshaping the 
world, albeit at a much smaller scale, perhaps even imperceptive to many. 
But the reassemblage of world neighbours on the Mongolian steppe shows 
that it is as much a working of big power competition as an active designing 
by the Mongols to build a world community of neighbours on the basis of 
sharing Mongolia’s fortune-sovereignty – the heshig. It is not a Zomia, a 
land of refuge (Perdue 2008, Scott 2009), but its opposite, a contentious 
land with bursting energy.
The f igure of neighbour is thus spatial and social as well as political. It 
is the proximity brought about by the reverse of the fortune-sovereignty 
that made China and the Chinese a neighbour that the Mongols have had 
to reckon with, and more importantly to establish their national boundary 
with. And similarly, like the ancient Chinese, who either cherished the 
men from afar (huairou yuanren 怀柔远人) or expelled the barbarians 
(quchu dalu/hulu 驱除鞑虏/胡虏) to maintain their ‘all under heaven’ 
(tianxia 天下), today, Mongols have also begun to engage in cosmic-moral 
re-ordering of the world around them, using their fortune-sovereignty.
Mongols are aware that in assembling neighbours from beyond Mongo-
lia’s immediate borders, Mongolia is actually building up a new regional 
polity to reduce conflict and hostility among nations in Northeast Asia. Ever 
conscious of history, the former Mongolian Ambassador to Japan Zamba 
Batjargal elaborated thus:
In 13th and 14th centuries, the Mongol Empire made the material and 
spiritual cultural exchange possible that linked the West and the East. 
And it created what we could call today a ‘free trade zone’ from Asia to 
Europe. It also established a political system that we could call the model 
of today’s republican states. That time, because it implemented a gener-
ous religious and national politics among the people under its control, 
it was able to avert conflict and collision… The Mongolia experience 
shows that today big states and small states could be in equal and helpful 
collaboration and it [i.e., the experience] even can become an important 
model for the advancement of the Northeast Asian unif ication process. 
(Narangoa 2009: 377-378)
The Mongolian case shows that neighbouring does not have to be seen as 
a zero-sum relational game between two countries. The relational is also 
the organizational; in organizing or assembling a neighbourhood, Mongolia 
has tried to build up a cosmopolitan structure with Mongolia as the central 
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node. And this is to be achieved through managing the economic interest 
of all the world’s powers by redistributing the fortune-sovereignty, that is, 
Mongolia’s strategic mineral resources, among them.
Note that all those who come to Mongolia uninvited or actively invited 
are world powers, richer, technologically more advanced, and certainly mili-
tarily more powerful than Mongolia. Mongolia has neither hard power, nor 
soft power to match any of these neighbours in a one to one situation. Had 
Mongolia followed the traditional nation-state centred approach, it would 
have to f ight on all fronts to keep the outsiders out, but this is precisely what 
Mongolia is least capable of. Instead of engaging in such a futile perimeter 
defence, Mongolia has proactively opened up its borders, reduced its number 
of soldiers, and invited the world in to share Mongolia’s new-found fortune-
sovereignty. It is in managing all these powerful neighbours, in maintaining 
peace among them by avoiding favouritism, or staying neutral in sharing 
Mongolia’s fortune-sovereignty that Mongolia elevates itself above all these 
powers, becoming a ‘big man’, as it were.
In this new polity, it would serve the interest of none of the compet-
ing powers to reduce Mongolia’s sovereign redistributive power. It is in 
everyone’s interest that Mongolia remains a functional society and its 
political institutions are strengthened, rather than weakened. In this new 
Mongolia-centred world community of neighbours in the making, it is 
advisable that all follow the Mongolian political proverb, which says: ‘deer 
n’ suudalaa olvol, door n’ guidlee olnoo’, that is, if his highness f inds his seat, 
those below will know how to run errands.
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